KOREA
Part 9 of the pamphlet, "OUR FOREIGN POLICY 1952":
KOREA
THE invasion of the Republic of Korea presented the United States and the United Nations with an emergency demanding immediate and vigorous action.
By that invasion the Soviet leaders made it clear ot the world that they would use military force to gain their ends, at least in places where they could achieve a quick victory.
But they underestimated the free world.
41
The United Nations Security Council acted with dramatic and unprecedented speed. It branded the at-tack as a breach of the peace. It called upon all mem-bers of the United Nations to go to the aid of the Republic of Korea. The United States rushed to Korea such forces as we had in the vicinity, and our troops were soon joined by forces of other U.N. members. This was a reluctant but necessary resort to force by the free and peace-loving members of the United Nations. Neither the American people nor their allies wanted to make Korea a springboard for a larger war. We knew that spreading the conflict beyond Korea would be the surest way of bringing on a third world war, rather than of preventing it. We went into Korea to help stop a specific aggression threatening both our particular interests in the Pacific and our general in- 42 terest in world security. We acted because it was the only way of protecting our own national security. If we and the other members of the United Nations had let Korea go under, we would have been aiding aggression by default. Such inaction would have created great fears in other countries that the successful aggressors might turn on them next and that they would be left alone to their fate. The United Nations would have been started down the same disastrous de-cline as the League of Nations when its peace-loving members failed to stand up against the first Axis aggressions in Manchuria and Ethiopia. By meeting the challenge, the United Nations gained strength and proved that collective security can work. In addition, this action roused the free world to the urgency of building up an adequate defense. The stakes involved in Korea are so important that we should be clear about what the military action there has accomplished. The announced aims of the com-munists were to conquer the Republic of Korea and drive the U.N. forces into the sea in the process. Success would have brought them within easy striking dis-tance of the heart of Japan. These aims have been frustrated. The communists themselves have accepted the present battle line as the military demarcation zone in the armistice negotiations. In other words, the aggressors have not pushed us into the sea and have actually ended up behind the 38th parallel from which the aggression started. The communists have suffered the staggering total 43 of more than I 1/2 million casualties, the cream of their armies. Their own economies have been hurt badly by the U.N. strategic embargo, and their ability to start trouble elsewhere has been somewhat reduced, at least for a time. The U.N. forces have not destroyed all of the power of China. That was not their job, and to have attempted it might have precipitated World War III. The U.N. forces have repelled the aggression that they went to Korea to repel.
41
The United Nations Security Council acted with dramatic and unprecedented speed. It branded the at-tack as a breach of the peace. It called upon all mem-bers of the United Nations to go to the aid of the Republic of Korea. The United States rushed to Korea such forces as we had in the vicinity, and our troops were soon joined by forces of other U.N. members. This was a reluctant but necessary resort to force by the free and peace-loving members of the United Nations. Neither the American people nor their allies wanted to make Korea a springboard for a larger war. We knew that spreading the conflict beyond Korea would be the surest way of bringing on a third world war, rather than of preventing it. We went into Korea to help stop a specific aggression threatening both our particular interests in the Pacific and our general in- 42 terest in world security. We acted because it was the only way of protecting our own national security. If we and the other members of the United Nations had let Korea go under, we would have been aiding aggression by default. Such inaction would have created great fears in other countries that the successful aggressors might turn on them next and that they would be left alone to their fate. The United Nations would have been started down the same disastrous de-cline as the League of Nations when its peace-loving members failed to stand up against the first Axis aggressions in Manchuria and Ethiopia. By meeting the challenge, the United Nations gained strength and proved that collective security can work. In addition, this action roused the free world to the urgency of building up an adequate defense. The stakes involved in Korea are so important that we should be clear about what the military action there has accomplished. The announced aims of the com-munists were to conquer the Republic of Korea and drive the U.N. forces into the sea in the process. Success would have brought them within easy striking dis-tance of the heart of Japan. These aims have been frustrated. The communists themselves have accepted the present battle line as the military demarcation zone in the armistice negotiations. In other words, the aggressors have not pushed us into the sea and have actually ended up behind the 38th parallel from which the aggression started. The communists have suffered the staggering total 43 of more than I 1/2 million casualties, the cream of their armies. Their own economies have been hurt badly by the U.N. strategic embargo, and their ability to start trouble elsewhere has been somewhat reduced, at least for a time. The U.N. forces have not destroyed all of the power of China. That was not their job, and to have attempted it might have precipitated World War III. The U.N. forces have repelled the aggression that they went to Korea to repel.
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